Acknowledgement

The research for this project was carried out in October 2017 with financial support from the USAID under the Obirodha Project. It was conducted by Professor Badiul Alam Majumdar, Ph.D. of The Hunger Project (Team Leader), Professor Lailufar Yasmin, Ph.D. of University of Dhaka, Professor Niloy Ranjan Biswas, Ph.D. of the University of Dhaka, and Mr. Saikat Shubhra Aich of The Hunger Project. We are most grateful to Mr. Jamirul Islam of The Hunger Project, Mr. Gias Uddin Jiqu, former Chairman of the Jhilongja Union Parishad and Ms. Mymuna Akhter for their invaluable assistance in completing this project. We thank all the respondents of FGDs and KIIs for their generous participation. We are also grateful to Dr. Shaukat Hassan, Chief of Party of the Obirodh Project for his support and guidance in carrying out this assessment. Furthermore, we acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Monzur Elahe of the Obirodh project for his assistance in doing this research. (Photo above of Rohingya refugee children by Michael Flatkowski)

Executive Summary

This rapid assessment was carried out primarily to identify the violent extremist issues relating to the recent Rohingya influx and the community hosting them. It is clear that the welcoming attitude of the host community toward the Rohingyas is disappearing fast and the prospect of conflict between the two groups is on the rise, partly due to the host community’s feeling increasing threats from the Rohingyas, who greatly outnumber them in some areas. There are also economic pressures on the host community from the recent influx of Rohingyas. The minority and ethnic members of the host community are also experiencing increased threats from the influx of Rohingyas.

Border areas of Cox’s Bazar district have been used in the past as a base for recruitment and training by extremist elements such as the HUJI-B, committed to liberating the Rohingya Muslims of Rakhine state of Myanmar. They worked with other Myanmar based organizations to create an infrastructure for radicalization and extremism in parts the host community. The intensity of these activities will increase with time, and with the call for Jihad by various local and international groups in the face of recent influx of huge number of refugees to Bangladesh. In fact, the plight of the Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar may become a rallying cry for all radical Islamist groups from all over the world to unite to fight for this cause. The extremely disaffected Rohingyas have already become the potential target for indoctrination and recruitment by the extremists, which is likely to intensify in the future.

Clearly, the local residents will not be immune from extremist recruitment as the host community has been and will continue to be used with increased intensity by the domestic and international extremist actors. The influx of Rohingyas will only worsen the situation in the host community, which is already seriously vulnerable to extremism. Such vulnerabilities are partly caused by the existence of major religious institutions, such as Hathazari and Patiya Qawmi Madrasas in greater Chittagong and similar institutions in Cox’s Bazar, and the increased religious fervors that go with the existence of such institutions. The rise of Hefazat-e-Islam’s movement in greater Chittagong and the entrenched strength of center-of-the right politics in Cox’s Bazar district only add impetus to these vulnerabilities.

Extremist recruitment of the Rohingyas in the camps is also likely to have spillover effects in the host community. If the extremist recruitment becomes a serious problem in the camps, the host community may even be swept over by the extremists. Furthermore, with the likelihood of the Rohingya refugees not returning to Myanmar in the near future, there may even be increased competition among local politicians to win over the Rohingyas as vote banks during elections by becoming more religious, therefore contributing to the radicalization of the entire society. We are already witnessing increased religiosity among major political actors of Bangladesh.

Increased risks of indoctrination and recruitment of the Rohingyas to Jihadism and using the host community as the base for such recruitment, including the recruitment of locals warrant immediate interventions to prevent them.

These interventions could include: uniting and mobilizing the host community to remove mistrust (e.g., inter-religious, inter-ethnic); promoting pluralism, inclusiveness and non-violent engagement with the Rohingya community; and improving the socio-economic conditions of the impoverished segment of the host community. Special and immediate focus should be given to women and youth employment. Once the present fluid situation stabilizes, interventions must then involve working with the leadership of the Rohingya community for non-violent engagement with the host community and to promote civic education for them. This will obviously require the government, non-government organizations and international organizations to work in partnership.

Introduction

Since August 25, 2017, a huge number of Rohingya Muslims have started to pour into Bangladesh, fleeing the religious and ethnic persecution and dehumanized treatment by Myanmar authorities. By government estimate, so far over 600,000 people have entered Bangladesh and more are coming every day. According to unofficial estimate, about a million have entered Bangladesh so far. These new entrants have joined about 400,000 Rohingyas already in Bangladesh from previous influxes. Despite outrage from many corners of the world against this heinous ‘ethnic cleansing’, there is no end in sight of the Rohingya crisis. Myanmar is unlikely to take most of them back. Most of the Rohingyas, because of atrocities, deprivations and lack of security, are also unlikely to return.

This huge influx of refugees and their concentration in Cox’s Bazar district has raised several serious issues: humanitarian, economic, environmental, regional relations, and most of all, security concerns. The security concerns have two dimensions: the potential conflict between the Rohingyas and the host community; and the radicalization of the Rohingyas who have suffered unprecedented deprivations, religious persecution and other inhuman atrocities. This rapid assessment is undertaken to identify the security risks associated with the Rohingya crisis, especially from the perspective of potential rise in violent extremism.

More specifically, the assessment is intended to identify the particular areas of:

Vulnerabilities to violent extremism for the host and Rohingya communities;
Conflict between the host community and the Rohingyas; and
Potential interventions to prevent radicalization and violent extremism among the host and Rohingya communities.

The Context

Bangladesh has been receiving the Rohingya refugees from the northern part of the Rakhine state of Myanmar since 1970s. The latest influx into Bangladesh commenced since August 25, 2017. In terms of sheer number, this influx has surpassed the previous influxes that Bangladesh has experienced.

According to available information, over a million Rohingya refugees are now living in Bangladesh, of which over 600,000 have come since the August 25, 2017 military crackdown on Rohingyas by the Myanmar army. Most of these refugees are located in two Upazilas of Cox’s Bazar district: Ukhia and Teknaf. It is believed that some of the refugees who arrived at the beginning have spread in other parts of Cox’s Bazar, including in and around the city of Cox’s Bazar.

The Rohingya Refugee Rehabilitation Commission (RRRC) has been conducting house-to-house survey of the refugees. The graphs below are based on the RRRC’s survey as of October 25 2017 and show the age distribution, family size, demography and identified vulnerabilities. Although the information underlying the graphs is a bit dated, they show important demographic

Figure 1: Demography of Rohingya refugees

characteristics of Rohingya refugees:

Majority of the refugees are children below the age of 18. Women headed households are 14% and child-headed household 5%.
Fertility rate and family sizes of the Rohingyas are quite high.
52% of the refugees are women. Bulk of the female refugees is adults above the age of 18 and many of them are of childbearing age. It is reported that about 80,000 women refugees are pregnant.
31% of refugees suffer from high vulnerability. According to a survey by the Ministry of Social Welfare, 36,373 orphaned children are living in and around camps, and many are at risk of abuse and trafficking

Cox’s Bazar district, with an area of 2491.86 square km, has been the host of most of the refugees. Almost all of the refugees are concentrated in two of its eight Upazilas – Ukhia and Teknaf. They are housed in 12 camps, 7 of which are in Ukhia and 5 in Teknaf. The population of Ukhia and Teknaf together is 4,27,913, while they are hosting more than 10, 00,000 new and old Rohingya refugees. Hence the host community is largely outnumbered by the refugees, threatening their ways of life and properties.

Cross-country criminal activities have been a serious problem in the border areas of the Cox’s Bazar district. The porous border between Bangladesh and Myanmar has for a long time been used for illegal drugs and arms trade and human trafficking. For example, according to a report published in The Daily Star, 1,50,000 people were trafficked through Bay of Bengal route in last four years. All of the illegal Yaba trade to Bangladesh comes from Myanmar. These illegal activities have been the sources of livelihood of many residents of the border areas. These activities are also patronized by political leaders. The local MP of Ukhia-Teknaf constituency is reported to be a major patron of cross-border illegal trade. The extremist groups are also involved in such activities.

The greater Chittagong has been the home of large Qawmi Madrasas, such Hathazari and Patiya Madrasas, and a hub of extremist variety of Islamic learning. There has also been a proliferation of Madrasas in the Cox’s Bazar district. For example, the Shah Porir Dwip, an area of Teknaf Upazila, which is a major landing point of Rohingyas, has about 10 madrasas in only about 5 sq km area. These Madrasas use outmoded curriculum fostering religious fanaticism. In fact, these Madrasas have been the base of Hefazat-e-Islam movement, which caused a serious havoc in Dhaka on May 5, 2013. The proliferation of such sensitive institutions and the promotion of an extremist brand of Islam by them led to a serious a political and cultural domination of Islamist and pro-Islamist forces in the greater Chittagong region, including in Cox’s Bazar. This is evidenced by the fact that Cox’s Bazar has become the stronghold for BNP-Jamaat coalition, which promotes a band of nationalism with Islamist flavour, and they won 3 out of the four constituencies in the 2008 Parliament when the Awami League led coalition won a landslide victory. The Awami League candidate, Abdur Rahman Bodi, who is accused of controlling the cross-border illegal trade between Bangladesh and Myanmar, won the remaining Ukhia-Teknaf constituency.

Another unique aspect of Cox’s Bazar is that it was the initial home of Harkatul Jihad-Bangladesh (HUJI-B), which was founded in the early 1990s in the Afghan-Pakistan border to help the Rohingya Muslims of Arakan in their struggle for liberation. The same report also identified that there were training camps for fighters in Ukhia, Teknaf and Bandarban forests in the 1990s. They recruited fighters from local Madrasas. The notorious Mufti Hannan and some of his cohorts were arrested from Ukhia in the mid 1990s. HUJI-B also worked with Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) and Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARNO). The BDR recovered large caches of arms in 2003, 2004 and 2005 apparently belonging to the Rohingya extremist groups from Naikkhongchhari forest. Thus, the relationship between the Rohingya fighters and the local extremist groups is longstanding and well established and the border of areas of Cox’s Bazar has been the hotbed of violent extremism since the 1990s. This creates leaves little doubt that the host community has pre-existing vulnerabilities to violent extremism.

Research Methodology

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In our rapid assessment, we used qualitative research methodology to grasp the perspectives of the respondents. Standard methodological tools, such as Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) were employed to capture the views and perspectives of the targeted population.

Our respondents included both the members of the host community and the refugees located in camps. In addition, representatives of a number of national and international organizations were interviewed by the researchers. Several government officials and members of law enforcement agencies were also included in our respondents.

The study selected the Cox’s Bazar District as the area of investigation, and the field work was done in the first week of November 2017. Among the eight Upazilas of Cox’s bazar, our research covered four Upazilas based on the following considerations:

The highest concentration of Rohingyas in these Upazilas; and
The highest level of interactions between the host community and the Rohingyas.

Table 1: List of Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

Date	Place	Interviews	FGDs
03 November 2017	Cox’s Bazar Sadar	4	1 [Cox’s Bazar civil society (19)]
04 November 2017	Ukhia	9	4 [Civil Society (24), female only (5), and minority male (13) only, 3 chairmen ]
05 November 2017	Teknaf	6	2 [Male only (21) and Female (10) only]
06 November 2017	Ramu & Ukhia	4	3 [Male only (10), Female only (5), and Hindu refugees at the camp (5)]
07 November 2017	Cox’s Bazar Sadar	3	1 [youth community (9)]
Total		26	11 (124 participants)

In total, we conducted 11 FGDs and 26 KIIs. The total number of participants in FDGs were 124 including men and women and of different age group. The team leader twice visited Cox’s Bazar and the refugee camps and he spoke with scores of people, including government officials, elected representatives, civil society leaders and members of the public. The research team also spoke with many individuals and groups during their week of field research. However, we only used in our report the interviews, which we found most pertinent.

A lot of secondary information on Rohingya issue is also available from published sources from within and outside the country. In fact, there has been a proliferation of writings on this issue since the early 1990s. Such secondary information has been used to substantiate the views and assertions of the respondents.

4. Research Findings and Analysis

4.1: Perceptions of the Host Community

The rapid assessment was carried out primarily to identify the violent extremist issues relating to the recent Rohingya influx and the community hosting them. The FGDs and KIIs conducted in Cox’s Bazar Sadar, Ukhia, Teknaf and Ramu among the host community revealed that the local people are quite unhappy about the situation that has been created due to the huge influx of refugees from Myanmar’s Rakhine state in recent months. Many of them have alleged that while the refugees who fled to Bangladesh in earlier months were harmed and uprooted by the Myanmar security forces, most of the recent refugees came to Bangladesh lured by the enormous benefits provided by Bangladesh and the international community

4.1.1: Changing perception of the host community towards the Rohingyas

During the fieldwork, we have found that initially the host community provided material help to the refugees in terms of food, water and other required items, which were absolutely necessary for their survival. Host community members sometimes gave khichuri (a mixture of rice and lentils cooked together), which in recent days the Rohingyas refused to eat.

The initial sympathetic attitude toward the refugees started to wane due to the attitude of the Rohingyas towards the host community. The participants in different FGDs pointed out that since the international donors started pouring in relief (food and materials to build makeshift shelters), the Rohingyas began to assert that it was neither the local community nor the Bangladesh government but rather the United Nations (UN) that “was taking care of them”. Many Rohingyas feel that they were living, it is alleged by some hosts, in the property of the UN, as a result they did not have to show any gratitude to the people of the local community or abide by the laws of Bangladesh.

It was alleged during the FGDs and KIIs with the host community members that the local law and order situation has deteriorated in their areas since the arrival of refugees. The cases of petty thievery including cattle lifting have spread in their communities. The locals suspect that it is the Rohingyas who are behind such illegal activities. They have also pointed out that one of the most wanted robbers of the region is a Rohingya who came to Bangladesh in the past and settled in their area. He is popularly known as “Hakim Dacoit” (robber), and he has been the source of trafficking and illegal trade in the area.

It was also pointed out that Rohingyas have become involved in local politics. Apparently one of the former Vice Chairman of Naikhanchari (of Bandarban district), named ‘Afsar” was a Rohingya who came to Bangladesh during the 1992 influx. It shows, the locals argued, how Rohingyas have gradually become a part of the local community.

The local community reported that in land which used to be the home of about 500,000 local people, the continuous influx of the Rohingyas have added an additional 1 to 1.2 million of people in the same land. They have voiced their concern that the same piece of land cannot accommodate such a large number of people without causing tensions and conflicts. A number of respondents compared the situation as “explosive”. Some of the suggested that the immediate solution would be to relocate the Rohingyas to Bhashan Char (Tanger Char is renamed). They did not see any possibility of a peaceful co-existence between the two communities as they identified that the Rohingyas are unruly and have already disrupted the local way of life. Assertions were also made in the FGDs and in KIIs that Rohingya refugees were ferocious in their dealings with the local community.

4.1.2. An abundance of material benefits provided to the Rohingyas and the movements of Rohingyas

The host community members pointed out that donors have not made any assessment about the needs as well as the level of understanding of the Rohingyas before distributing relief goods. As a result, the Rohingyas are given too much and sometimes unnecessary products as relief. Two particular examples were pointed out during FGDs. First, Rohingya women do not know the use of sanitary napkins. When they were given sanitary napkins, they used them as masks over their faces. Second, participants in the FGD pointed out that some Rohingyas were using powder milks as washing powders.

It was also asserted by some members of the host community that many relief goods are being sold by Rohingyas in the local market at low prices. For example, lentils are sold by Rohingyas for Tk. 40 per kg although the regular market price is much higher. Two liters of oil is being sold in the local market for Tk. 30/40, which is much lower than the market price. The Rohingyas are apparently selling the relief goods for cash which they badly need.With such abundance, the locals have suggested that government give some relief goods to the most vulnerable groups of the local community. A proposal regarding this has already been sent out by the local Chairmen to the government. However, one of the respondents in a FGD pointed out, “amra tran chai na, poritran chai” (we do not want relief but we want the Rohingyas to leave).

The locals have complained that many of the Rohingyas who came to Bangladesh at later stages were informed of this abundance of relief goods. They were informed that without having to work, they would be able to survive on free food. During the FGDs, one of the participants recited this short poem:

Oi khane kaj kore khabar pai

Ei khane lainee dariay khabar pai

(that we had to work to get food there while here we get food only standing in the queue)

The spread of local SIMs giving connectivity well inside Myanmar has made it easier to keep the communication channels open between the Rohingyas living here and on the banks of the river Naf. Although this abundance of relief continues during this “honeymoon period” – a term used by the DC of Cox’s Bazar – the locals are worried about what will happen once the easy source of relief dries up. They fear that it may create direct competition and conflicts for livelihood between the two communities.

It is clear that many in the host community think that the Rohingya refugees are being pampered by donors, whereas the practical issues such as price hikes that the locals are experiencing have not been addressed by the authorities. According to the hosts, the influx of refugees has created an adverse effect on the prices of commodities in the market. They gave the examples of onions, tomatoes and other vegetables, the prices of which have reached to an unbearable level. The members of the host community further pointed out that the local transportation costs as well as the lack of availability of transports have made them worried.

According to some of the host community members, while the police are supposed to check if any Rohingya is getting out of the camp, they are often indifferent. The police are also expected to catch stray Rohingyas and send them back to camps, which they are also failing to do. This is why it has been easier for Rohingyas to spread easily in others parts of the country. There are multiple reports of Rohingyas showing up in different parts of the country while carrying out this research. For example, on November 7, two Bangladeshis were apprehended in Brahmanbaria with about 10 Rohingya women. It clearly shows that crossing the boundaries of the Cox’s Bazar district is not impossible.

Some respondents pointed out that while the restrictions on letting any outsiders enter the Rohingya camps after 5 pm is enforced strictly, there is no such monitoring on the movement of Rohingyas. They pointed out that it is rather easier for Rohingyas to leave the camps and come to nearby cities to seek short term work and earn cash. They also pointed out that such relaxation in the movement of allowed some them to rent houses to live in nearby community.

Similarly, the locals complained that while the Police are taking somewhat relaxed attitude in identifying the Rohingyas leaving and sending them back to the camps, they are rather harsh to the local community. The respondents in almost all FGDs pointed out that they were being harassed by the police in the name of checking ID cards. They complained that despite being citizens of the country, they need to carry national ID cards all the time, which is not the case for Bangladeshi citizens living in other parts of the country.

4.1.3. The political use of the Rohingyas and the effect on the labor market

There is a fear among the Rohingyas, according to some members of the local community, that if they register, they will be sent back to Myanmar. This fear has prevented a number of Rohingyas from registering.

The Rohingyas, according to the locals, can be easily manipulated by the political leaders by offering money. Some of the participants in FGD and KII have also provided examples of the use of Rohingyas in political rallies. Moreover, one of the KIIs informed that it has been easier to hire a contract killer from Rohingyas paying only Tk. 5,000. This has made the local community worried about their safety as well as the safety of the country.

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Due to the willingness of the Rohingyas to sell their labor for a cheap price, it is the daily laborers who are losing jobs. While a local daily laborer will work for TK. 500 remuneration per day, the Rohingyas are willing to do the same work for Tk. 200/300 per day. This has caused unemployment within the local daily laborer community. The locals in the fishing industry are also suffering as Rohingyas are willing to work in fishing boats for low wages. Yet there is scarcity of fish in the region. The region which used to be self-sufficient in fish is now importing fish from Satkhira, a southwestern district of Bangladesh.

It was also pointed out that a number of Rohingyas, who came to Bangladesh during earlier influxes, were able to secure Bangladeshi passports and secure jobs in countries like Saudi Arab and Malaysia. These Rohingyas have been sending money to the local Rohingyas, which has been the source of their support.

1.1.4. Effect in the education sector

The participants in the FGDs as well as the KIIs pointed out that they had serious concerns regarding the loss of academic year for the local students. During the initial influx, it was the school and college premises which were used for housing Rohingyas. This has severely disrupted the regular academic activities. Although the refugees were later moved to camps, many of the local school and college grounds are now used to store relief goods and therefore are still unusable for carrying out regular academic activities. One of the KIIs informed that the test examination of HSC candidates is supposed to take place on December 18, but under the circumstances, he did not see any possibility of holding the examination.Another dimension of this problem is that many college students are taking temporary breaks from studies for short term employment in Rohingya refugee camps and hence skipping their classes. The participants in the FGDs showed concern regarding this as these types of jobs do not have long term sustainability. They fear that as the refugee situation get under control, these youths would lose their jobs and they have also already fallen behind in their education. This may lead to frustration, creating a potential fertile ground of recruitment for extremist activities.

4.1.5. Effect on the health sector

The local community also pointed out their concerns regarding the health sector. They complained that the Rohingyas are given priority in terms getting access to health facilities. This has created resentment among the local community as, they pointed out, despite being the citizens of the country, they were rather being treated as outsiders. Respondents in FGD also identified the Rohingyas as unruly and they often demand prioritized services. Because of their raucous behavior, service providers are often intimidated to attend Rohingya patients, thereby ignoring the locals.

The participants of the FGD also showed concern that the Rohingyas were bringing HIV AIDS to the local community. They fear the use of female Rohingyas in the local sex industry as well as trafficking of women in other parts of country would help the spread of HIV AIDS in the country. They complained that Rohingya women are dressed up in local attire and have been taught to behave like local women while being trafficked to other parts of the country. However, if they are asked to count the numbers, their inability to pronounce ‘seven’ in Bengali reveals their true identity.

The local community is concerned that while Bangladesh has an effective immunization program which protects local children, Rohingya children are not immunized. The unhealthy living conditions of the Rohingyas, the some hosts complained, may be the breeding ground for new kinds of diseases.

One of the issues raised by respondents in different FGDs was how the Rohingyas use their illness to flee refugee camps. The respondents pointed out that in many cases, they pretend to be very ill and request the attendee doctor of the camps to refer them to Cox’s Bazar Sadar hospital for better treatment. The patient is generally accompanied by a number of others. However, while the patient’s name is registered, the names of the people who accompany him/her to the outside hospital are not enlisted as leaving the camps. This provides opportunity for Rohingyas to travel to Cox’s Bazar Sadar and disappear.

4.1.6. Insecurities within the minority community

The Buddhist and Rakhaine communities in Cox’s Bazar Sadar, Ramu, Teknaf and Ukhia are quite vulnerable due to the new influx of Rohingya refugees. In FGDs and interviews, they expressed their deep concerns about potential threats of violence against them. A leader of the Buddhist community from Cox’s Bazar, in an interview, observed that the local administration has been cooperative with them since the beginning of this year. Nevertheless they are not completely out of danger. He further shared that the local political elites often exploited the Rohingyas to create religious issues against the minorities. He reminded us of the incident of 2012 when six Buddhist temples were attacked by agitated Muslim attackers. They vandalized those temples and torched several houses of Buddhist communities in Ramu. International news outlets reported that Muslim Rohingya refugees were involved in attacks on Buddhist temples and homes in Ramu. It is said that the violence was triggered by a photo posted on Facebook that insulted Islam. The interviewee was apprehensive that a similar attack may take place in Ramu or other areas in Cox’s Bazar, particularly in the areas of minority concentration. In the FGD with the minority communities of Ukhia, similar concerns were expressed by the participants. The member of the minority was particularly concerned about the potential use of the Rohingyas by the local political and social elites from the majority Muslim community. According to them, if the local/host communities are united to protect them, Rohingyas will not be able to breach their security. Therefore, locals from the majority community have significant responsibilities to protect their neighbors from potential security threats.

Political leaders often dictate the minority community to take certain actions against their will. A case in point is that after 25 August, the Buddhist leaders were pressured by the local Member of the Parliament (MP) to organize a human chain condemning the activities of Myanmar Government and its military. A Buddhist religious leader (Vante) of a local temple, in his interview, observed that the attitude of the local MP was aggressive. Although the local Buddhist community did not support the activities of Myanmar Government, the intimidating way they were approached by the local ruling party leaders was quite a shock to him. Nevertheless, they immediately agreed and organized a human chain to protest the case of persecution of Rohingyas by Myanmar’s authorities.

In addition, the Buddhist communities in Chittagong and Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) areas often face hate speech and threats in their everyday lives. For example, a rumor was spread in Ukhia and in greater Cox’s Bazar area that if Bangladeshi people create troubles for Buddhists and push them to Myanmar, Myanmar authorities will stop persecuting Muslims and will not expel them to Bangladesh. Although the source of this statement was not very clear, the Buddhists took it quite seriously. Consequently, they increased the security of their temples, installed CCTV cameras and enhanced foot patrolling at night by community members.

In addition to the minorities of the host community, one needs to understand the nature of persecution of the Hindu refugees of Myanmar. Around 143 Hindu families crossed the border to come to Bangladesh in early September. In a FGD with a group of Hindu Rohingyas, the respondents shared how they faced persecutions by an armed group of Rohingya Muslims of Arakan. The local media also publicized the news that the persecution of the Hindus was the act of Islamic terrorists. Some of them, they alleged, were kidnapped after they were settled in a separate camp built by Bangladesh Government. Two are still missing from that kidnapping. Interviews and participants of the FGD believe it was done by the same group of armed fighters and their cohorts. Their intention was to convert the captured Hindu Rohingyas and recruit them for crimes. The Hindu minorities are still very scared and they believe that these perpetrators are living in nearby camps. They might return again to attack them.

Hindu refugee camp is also visibly unprotected. During the visit of the research team, only three members of the law enforcement agencies were stationed to protect a community of more than 400 refugees. No relief agencies have permanent office in the camp. This is a completely different picture compared to the nearest Muslim Rohingya camps. In an interview with the local UNO, this was raised and he mentioned that the local administration has already allocated a separate place for the Hindu refugees. They will be transferred to a better and secured place. He assured us that the Hindu refugees would receive similar support from the national and international agencies involved in relief operations.

4.1.7. Women’s Issues

Women of the host community are concerned about various issues since the influx of Rohingyas since late August. They are generally concerned about the price hikes as it is the women who have to put food on the table. They complained that it has become increasingly challenging for them to provide quality food for their families since the influx started.

Women are also concerned about local men marrying Rohingya women. They pointed out varied reasons for this, including that Rohingya women are generally considered prettier than local women; that local men do not have to meet the demands of dowry as per the Islamic laws of marriage to marry Rohingya women; and that the Rohingya women only require fulfilling their basic requirements such as food and shelter. Under such circumstances, one family’s resources are being shared by multiple families. The respondents identified this as a threat to the existing social fabric of the area.

Since there are reports of the spread of HIV AIDS among the Rohingyas, the local women felt that it would spread in the local community primarily because of local men marrying Rohingya women. The lady Vice Chairman of Teknaf Upazila stated that she had to hold three mediations in one week concerning the issue of local men marrying Rohingya women. The respondents in different FGDs also raised the issue of local women marrying Rohingya men. They claimed that the local women, who could not find grooms due to some shortcomings of their own, are now marrying Rohingya men, which provides them the status of being ‘married’. Female participants in FGDs shared their worries that this would severely affect not only their culture but also provide acceptability of the Rohingyas in the society in the long run.

4.2 Drivers of Violent Extremism in Rohingya Camps and Border Areas

4.2.1. Movement of Undocumented People/Organizations in Camps and Border Areas

Many respondents in interviews and focus group discussions expressed their concerns about the movements of undocumented and dangerous people in the refugee camps and areas near Bangladesh-India border. This has become a critical concern due to the increased possibility of rise of violent extremism. They claimed that Myanmar-based organized groups, such as Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) or Al-Yaqeen, regularly come to the refugee camps of Ukhia and Teknaf, which could fuel further violence in the region and beyond. In a Focus Group Discussion with journalists and civil society members of Cox’s Bazar, a local correspondent of a national newspaper observed,

With the huge influx of people from Arakan since 25 August of this year, a significant number of the members of armed groups have moved into Bangladesh and they are now living in the camps. They fought against the army and police of Myanmar because they wanted to free their lands. They are quite aggressive and are likely to engage in fights with anyone they consider as threats.

Other respondents in the FGD supported this observation. One of them added that if the Rohingya refugees are confined in camps and are prevented from mixing with the local community, they would become more aggressive and violent. Local citizens and the members of the law enforcement agencies vividly described a recent incident of violence. On 21 October, a member of Bangladesh Police, who was in-charge of Noyapara Rohingya camp in Teknaf Upazila, received critical injuries as a group of Rohingyas allegedly attacked him over the construction of a shop inside the camp without the permission of the local administration. The report was substantiated by a senior police officer of the Teknaf Model Police Station in an interview with the researchers. He mentioned that they arrested three armed Rohingyas from their newly settled camps. This substantiates the concern of the locals about the presence of armed men in the camps creating insecurity and potential for violence. An interview with the former Chairman of a village in Mongdu area who is now living in Hakimpara camp of Ukhia, however, did not support the claim that the refugees carried arms in the camps. He denied the presence of any member ARSA or Al-Yaqeen in his camp, although he mentioned that he had heard about the movement of armed people across the borders with other Rohingyas.

Since the camps are closed for outsiders after 5 pm, the Rohingyas become, according to respondents, captive audiences of the vested interest groups. Interviews in the Rohingya camps highlight the significance of mosque and religious institutions within the camp. It is reported that 123 new Mosques were built in camps in the last few weeks. A Rohingya interviewee from the Hakimpara camp in Ukhia mentioned that they spent a significant amount of their time in the mosques. They are invited to pray by the religious leaders and listen to the sermons after the prayers. They also receive invitations in other times to gather in the Mosque and discuss various issues. The Mosques have thus become important places of socialization and perhaps indoctrination in the camps. In their gatherings in the Mosque they mostly discuss their miseries and future. However, local host community members, in both interviews and FGDs, expressed their concerns about the Mosques and other sensitive religious organization-led activities in the camps. Secondary sources have identified that thirty organizations are already active in camps trying to recruit the Rohingyas. Because of what the Rohingyas went through, they are undeniably most vulnerable to be influenced and recruited by extremists. As Aung San Suu Kyi, in her Noble Peace Price Lecture, observed, “Whenever suffering is ignored, there will be the seeds of conflict, for suffering degrades and embitters and enrages.” After visiting the Rohingya camps prior to joining the Dhaka Literary Festival, 2017, Azeem Ibrahim, a world renowned expert on Rohingya issue, stated that even he would be an extremist if he had to live in such utter misery, knowing that he would be an extremist if he had to live in such misery, knowing that there lay no future either for him or his next generation.

A local organizer of the Islamic Foundation (Bangladesh), the government-led coordinating agency for the religious organizations, in an interview, mentioned that his organization monitors the religious activities and institutions within the camps. Since the beginning of the influx, a huge number of individuals in groups (e.g. Tabligh Jamaat) have come and offered money to refugees. He further mentioned, “It went beyond our jurisdiction. We were not able to monitor who have been entering the camp and for what purpose. I noticed that the [Mulanas, people with Islamic religious leaders] were offering money to young children who came to Mosque for prayers. I felt that there must be something wrong. How do they get permission to work in the camps?” Although the management of camps has increased since the Army deployment, however, the movement of people with questionable intentions is still going on.

On 6 November 2017, the local administration and police ran a joint operation in the camps of Ukhia and arrested 26 people, including five foreigners and 11 religious leaders. They did not have any permission to stay in the camp areas after 5 pm. Their intention was not clear to the police who were investigating the case. However, this incident strengthens the claim of the locals that the movements of suspicious people in the camps exist.

In an interview with the researchers, the Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO) of Ukhia raised his concern about the presence of unregistered local and international actors in the camps after hours. He emphasized on the need for coordination among different agencies, both national and international. International organizations often initiate their activities, he complained, without permission from appropriate authorities. Many local NGOs and national religious organizations also work in the camps without following the proper authorization process. For example, his office has faced problem as a Dhaka-based orphanage, funded by religious groups, came to Ukhia and built a makeshift orphanage with a fake permission. When this venture was stopped by the local administration, they faced pressure from unknown sources.

It may be noted that Al-Qaida already called for Jihad in Arakan state, so are the groups in Indonesia and other countries. Since there is very little chance for the Rohingya of returning to Myanmar in the near future, pressure is likely to be built up from within the country to train and send them to Myanmar for causing mischief.

4.2.2. Movements and Connectivity of Rohingyas Untracked after Evening

It is evident that Rohingya refugees would like to move out of the camps. A good number of the Refugees who came to Bangladesh in early 1980s and 1990s had moved to Cox’s Bazar, Chittagong and other areas with the help of the local elites bypassing the restrictions of the administration. In FGDs and interviews, respondents indicated that it has become more difficult for the local administration to restrict the movements between and outside the camps after the recent influx of huge numbers of refugees. In an interview, a member of the community police forum of Teknaf highlighted the issue of untracked movements of Rohingyas. He was one of the first responders in the Teknaf border areas when the gate was opened on 25 August of this year. He mentioned that new refugees managed to get mobile SIM cards and use phones with Bangladeshi numbers to contact their fellow family members in Myanmar. Using the cell phones, he complained, they are now inviting others to come to Bangladesh, as there are more foods and other basic amenities available due to international relief operations.

A Rohingya refugee from the camp mentioned that he was in touch with his distant family members in Myanmar. He also informed them about the situation in camps in Bangladesh. He was also getting updates on politics and military operations in Myanmar. When he was asked how he got a SIM card, he was non-responsive and it was clear that he got it using illegal means with the help of a local person. In a FGD organized with the journalists and local civil society members in Teknaf, respondents complained about the use of social networking websites by the Rohingyas from registered camps and others living outside the camps. One of the respondents suggested that a section of Rohingyas are engaged in spreading hate speech capitalizing on the persecution of the Myanmar army to create instability within the local communities of Cox’s Bazar, Teknaf and Ukhia. The local administration, however, was not sure of the source of such cyber crimes and was unable to ascertain whether these were locally or internationally generated by organized groups of Rohingya refugees. Nevertheless, it is clear that some of the Rohingyas in the camp are well connected with other members of their community using telecommunication and cyber technologies. Authorities are seriously concerned that modern technology may be used to facilitate connectivity among the members of the armed groups located in border areas of Bangladesh and Myanmar.

Another interviewee shared an alarming story surrounding Qawmi Madrasas that are located in the deep forest of the border areas of Myanmar. He narrated that a significant number of the students of these Madrasas are young Rohingya Muslims. They frequently cross the border to visit their families. He observed that some of these Madrasas went empty before 25 August and his speculation was that the Myanmar’s Rohingya students left to join ARSA’s movement to attack police and army camps. Although his claims are not substantiated by other sources, other respondents of FGDs observed that armed Rohingyas had always exploited a porous border and moved back and forth between Bangladesh and Myanmar.

Narcotic Drugs

Interviewees and participants of FGDs argue that the influx of Rohingya refugees fleeing Myanmar will increase the trade and use of narcotic drugs, such as Yaba (methamphetamine) in the cities and villages of Bangladesh. Rohingyas also claim that their young people are being pushed into crime because they cannot legally work in Myanmar. In a FGD with the young people, the college and university students of Cox’s Bazar discussed the problem of Yaba addiction. They expressed their concerns that the young people of the local community are affected by the synthetic narcotic drugs carried by Rohingya refugees. A student of a Cox’s Bazar college pointed out that the current influx has not only brought us destitute human being from Myanmar, “they have also brought Yaba with them to trade with the local drug peddlers.” This is also highlighted in the news media. In September of this year, the Department of Narcotics Control (DNC) arrested five drug peddlers, including a Rohingya refugee, with 8,200 Yaba pills in two drives in Chittagong city. Such evidence substantiates the involvement of Rohingyas in the illegal drug trade. Although it is difficult to establish a link between the drug trade, use of drugs and the involvement of the youth in violent extremism, the evidence from the west indicate that the majority of violent extremists had criminal past.

In an interview with a local politician from the ruling party, the impact of synthetic drug on local youth has been discussed. He mentioned, “Yaba has destroyed the young generation of Teknaf and Ukhia and now it has spread all over Bangladesh. An addicted youth can do anything for a pill. They have become increasingly violent due to their addiction.” He observed how a segment of the powerful local politicians have exploited the Rohingyas and encouraged them to get involved in drug trade. They were also engaged in arms smuggling in the border area. Thus, both Rohingya and local youths are used or abused by the vested interested groups for illegal activities.

Trafficking of Orphan Children and Single Women from the Camps

A local NGO worker in a FGD in Teknaf highlighted the risk of child and women trafficking from the camps. She has experienced the process of how the Rohingya women refugees, who arrived earlier in the 1990s, were trafficked within Bangladesh and to the Middle Eastern countries. She speculates that trafficking will increase with the arrival of new refugees, if the government does not take necessary measures. International news outlets have also highlighted that the “trafficking networks already exist in southern Bangladesh’s sprawling camps, which have been overwhelmed by the arrival of more than 600,000 Rohingyas fleeing Myanmar over the last two months… Six out of ten of the new arrivals in the Bangladesh camps are children, providing a fertile hunting ground for traffickers looking for young girls to recruit as maids.” Women are the victims of both internal and international trafficking.

In FGDs conducted both in Ukhia and Teknaf, some respondents shared that they already received requests from their relatives from Dhaka and Chittagong for Rohingya household-help. In the past, young Rohingya girls were moved to cities for the jobs of household-help. The new influx has opened up a new business opportunity for the local middlemen who are convincing young women and girls from the camps to go with them for a ‘better future’. Moreover, unprotected camps could be a good source of trafficking of young women for prostitution. A youth respondent in one FGD in Cox’s Bazar mentioned that the number of young girls engaging in prostitution has increased since August of this year. “This is a tourist zone of Bangladesh and prostitution is always attractive in resorts and motels. The women of the new camps could easily be the targets of the pimps. Gradually they will also be trafficked to international destinations, such as the Middle East.”

A large percentage of the refugees are children and they at most risk of being trafficked to various destination. A FGD participant from Teknaf highlighted that the children are often trafficked by the armed groups of Arakan, such as ARSA, who train them as their soldiers. Others also supported this claim in the group discussion. Some respondents feared that recruiters would target the orphan children of the new camps for violent extremism or other types of criminal activities. This needs to be addressed carefully and urgently by the government and international organizations.

5. Mapping out the most vulnerable areas that need immediate attention

The field investigation in the district of Cox’s Bazar identified several segments of the host community that need immediate attention.

Table 2: Most vulnerable areas and communities

Most Vulnerable Areas	Most Vulnerable Groups	Potential Victim Groups
Cox’s Bazar Sadar	YouthsWomen	Religious and Ethnic Minorities Children
Ukhia	YouthsWomen	Religious and Ethnic Minorities Children
Teknaf	YouthsWomen	Religious and Ethnic MinoritiesChildren
Ramu	YouthsWomen	Religious and Ethnic Minorities Children

Conclusions and Potential Interventions to Prevent Violent Extremism

Based on the rapid assessment of the impact of Rohingya influx and the community hosting them, it is clear that the welcoming attitude of the host community toward the Rohingyas is disappearing fast and the prospect of conflict between the two groups is on the rise. This is because of the fact that the host community is feeling increasing threats from the Rohingyas, who greatly outnumber them in some areas. There are also economic pressures on the host community from the recent influx of Rohingyas. The minority and ethnic members of the host community face increased threats from the influx of Rohingyas.

Border areas of Cox’s Bazar district have been used in the past as a base for recruitment and training by extremist elements such as the HUJI-B, committed to liberating the Rohingya Muslims of Rakhine state of Myanmar. They worked with other Myanmar based organizations to already create an infrastructure for radicalization and extremism in the border areas. The intensity of these activities will increase with time, and with the call for Jihad by various local and international groups in the face of recent influx of huge number of refugees to Bangladesh. In fact, the plight of the Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar may become a rallying cry for all radical Islamist groups from all over the world to unite to fight for their cause. The extremely disaffected Rohingyas have already become the potential target for indoctrination and recruitment by the extremists, which is likely to intensify in the future.

Drivers of VE in the Rohingya Community

Enabling Environments	Pull Factors	Push Factors
Safer and secure life in Bangladesh	Strong sense of Muslim Ummah due to religious persecution	Persecution in Myanmar makes the Rohingyas most disaffected and vulnerable to radical recruitment
Abundance of Relief and other material goods	Call for Jihad by local and international radical groups	Deprivation of basic needs and rights and inhuman treatment
Support from the Muslim world	Vision of a Free Arakan State (from Feni to Arakan)	Prejudice against non-Muslims
Support from pro-extremists and other vested interest groups
Building of sensitive institutions like Mosques – 123 so far built – which have become places of socialization, religious teachings and radical recruitment
Existence of armed militant groups
Opportunity for cross border smuggling of drugs and arms

Clearly, the local residents will not be immune from extremist recruitment as the host community has been and will continue to be used with increased intensity by the domestic and international extremist actors. Already some extremists are getting to the host community in the guise of Tablig Jamaat. In fact, the influx of Rohingyas will only worsen the situation in the host community, which is already seriously vulnerable to extremism. Such vulnerabilities are partly caused by the existence of major religious institutions, such as Hathazari and Patiya Qawmi Madrasas in greater Chittagong and similar sensitive institutions in Cox’s Bazar, and the increased religious fervors that go with the existence of such institutions. The rise of Hefazat-e-Islam’s movement in greater Chittagong and the entrenched strength of center-of-the right politics in Cox’s Bazar district only add impetus to these vulnerabilities.

Drivers of VE in the Host Community

Enabling Environments	Pull Factors	Push Factors
Existence of armed militant groups	Strong sense of Muslim Ummah	Retribution for persecution of Muslims in Myanmar
Opportunity for cross border smuggling of drugs and arms	Call for Jihad by local and international radical groups	Deprivation of basic needs and rights and inhuman treatment
Increased Religiosity	Support from the Muslim world	Prejudice against non-Muslims
Infiltration of radicals in mosques and madrassas	Support from pro-radical and other vested interest groups	Democratic deficits
Religious sermons spreading hate speech	Existence of untracked Mosques and Madrssas which extremists exploit for radical recruitment	Shrinking democratic space
Increased Identity based prejudices	Appealing extremist narrative	Political repression
Less inter-cultural interactions	Vision for `Caliphate’	Violation of human rights
State support for pro-radical values	Ideological motivation	Corruption with impunity
Confrontational/violent politics	Reward in the afterlife	Frustrated expectations for educated youth
	Craving for engaging with something bigger/cause/fame	Lack of opportunity
	Terror financing	Social exclusion
	Alternative economic opportunity
	Peer pressure, social media

It is thus clear that both the ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors for conflict, radicalization and violent extremism, identified in the literature, exist in Rohingya community. Consequently, the condition in Cox’s Bazar, involving both the Rohingya and host communities, can be compared to a slow boiling kettle, with potential for boiling over in the future. Although the Rohingya crisis is primarily a humanitarian issue at this time, it is likely to turn into a more serious violent extremism issue in the future unless the crisis is dealt with properly, effectively and promptly. We may therefore be standing on a powder keg, which could explode in the future. Such an explosion will not only destabilize Bangladesh, it is also likely to destabilize the entire region and threaten the life style taken for granted around the world.

Increased risks of indoctrination and recruitment of the Rohingyas to Jihadism and using the community as the base for such recruitment warrant immediate interventions to prevent them. The potential interventions are:

Unite, mobilize and empower the host community to remove mistrust (e.g., inter-religious, inter-ethnic), promote pluralism and inclusiveness and for non-violent engagement with the Rohingya community.
Initiate interventions to improve the socio-economic conditions of the impoverished segment of the host community. Special focus should be given to women and youth employment.
Work with the leadership of the Rohingya community for non-violent engagement with the host community once the situation in refugee camps stabilizes and the government develops a comprehensive PVE strategy.
In the long-run, there will have to be program for civic education for the Rohingyas in addition to programs for education, health and sustainable livelihood

The last two interventions will require the government, non-government organizations and international organizations to work in partnership with each other.

Report on Rapid Assessment of the Rohingya Crisis and Its Potential for Violent Extremism